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Section 230

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is a 1996 law that bars treating providers and users of online services as the publisher or speaker of content posted by others. Courts, beginning with the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online (1997), have read it as giving online services broad immunity from liability for their users’ content.

Who answers for a post, before and after Section 230 Run a 1990s message board through the cases that shaped who could be held liable for a user's post, then see what Section 230 changed and what it leaves out.

Step 1: you run a message board in 1991 and do not review posts before they appear. Like a bookstore, the service is not liable for a user's post unless it knew or had reason to know about it, so being told about the post opens it to liability; the company the post is about could then hold the author or the service liable. Step 2: if the service moderates, with rules, moderators and removals, as Prodigy did and advertised, the 1995 Stratton Oakmont reasoning treats it like a newspaper, held to a publisher's standard instead of the bookstore's lower standard of knowing about the post; on those facts, moderating raised its exposure. The court said boards without significant editorial control should normally still be treated like bookstores. Step 3: under Section 230, the moderated service cannot be treated as the publisher of the post, and it is protected from liability to the poster for removing posts in good faith. The company the post is about can hold only the author liable, if the author can be identified. Step 4: under the Zeran reading, being told about the post and leaving it up no longer changes the service's protection, unlike in step 1, and the protection does not depend on whether the service moderates. Other federal courts have followed that reading, and it has also been questioned. The person who wrote the post can still be held liable throughout. Step 5: the protection does not apply to federal criminal law, intellectual property law such as copyright, or communications privacy law, nor, since 2018, to certain sex-trafficking claims and state prosecutions for promoting prostitution; for those, the other law decides.

Cómo funciona
Basado en
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). (1991). Step 1: the service as a distributor with no more editorial control than "a public library, book store, or newsstand", liable only if it knew or had reason to know.
Digital Media Law Project, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. Step 2: the 1995 New York trial-court holding that Prodigy's guidelines, moderators and screening software were enough to treat it as a publisher.
U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2023 Edition). 47 U.S.C. § 230 — Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. Steps 3 and 5: subsections (c)(1), (c)(2) and (e).
U.S. House of Representatives, via U.S. Government Publishing Office. Telecommunications Act of 1996: Conference Report to Accompany S. 652 (H. Rept. 104-458). (1996). Step 3: the conferees' statement that one purpose of the section was to overrule Stratton Oakmont.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). (1997). Step 4: being notified of a post does not remove the protection; the person who posted it remains liable.
Jr., D. L. H. (2009). Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir.) (1997). Step 4: other federal courts have followed Zeran's interpretation.
Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, No. 19-1284 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). (2020). Step 4: Justice Thomas questioned whether the text supports extending the immunity to distributor liability, as Zeran did.
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253. Step 5: the sex-trafficking exception added in 2018 as § 230(e)(5).
Qué supone
  • The post is treated as defamatory for the sake of the illustration. Whether a statement is defamatory, and whether a lawsuit against anyone succeeds, are separate questions the illustration does not show.
  • The example post, an accusation that a company is defrauding its customers, follows the kind of posts at issue in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy.
  • Being told about the post stands for knowing, or having reason to know, about it.
  • The person who wrote the post is assumed to be identifiable. In Zeran v. America Online, the poster was never identified.
  • Steps 1 and 2 show the reasoning of two trial-court decisions, one federal and one in a New York state court, on their facts. Neither bound courts across the country.
  • Step 4 shows the Fourth Circuit's answer on notice in Zeran v. America Online, which other federal courts have followed and which has also been questioned, including by Justice Clarence Thomas in 2020. It is not shown as settled. How courts have read the statute in other respects is not shown.
Qué deja fuera
  • Content the service itself writes or helps develop, which Section 230 does not protect.
  • Section 230's protection for individual users of a service, as well as for the service.
  • The exception for state laws consistent with Section 230.
  • Recommendation algorithms, and Gonzalez v. Google (2023), in which the Supreme Court declined to address the scope of Section 230.
  • First Amendment questions.
  • The other laws that apply where Section 230 does not, and how they decide liability.
  • Proposals to change Section 230.
Qué no demuestra
How any real case would be decided, how often services are sued or moderate their users' posts, or whether the rule is good policy.

Key Provisions

The law contains two main provisions:

  1. Publisher or speaker: Subsection (c)(1) provides that no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by someone else. Legal scholar Jeff Kosseff titled his 2019 history of the law The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet, a reference to these 26 words.
  2. Good-faith removal: Subsection (c)(2), under the statute’s heading “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,” protects providers and users from liability for good-faith actions to restrict access to material they consider objectionable.

Historical Context

Section 230 was enacted as part of the Communications Decency Act, Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, signed February 8, 1996. Its stated purposes under Section 230(b) include promoting internet development, preserving the free market, encouraging the development of technologies for user control, and removing disincentives for the development of blocking and filtering technologies that let parents restrict children’s access to objectionable material. It followed two court decisions that reached different results on different facts:

  • Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. (1991) - Found CompuServe acted as a distributor rather than publisher, liable only if it knew or had reason to know of defamatory content. The court reasoned that CompuServe had no more editorial control over the newsletter at issue than a public library, bookstore or newsstand
  • Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. (1995) - On a motion for partial summary judgment, a New York state trial court found Prodigy could be held liable as a publisher because it publicly held itself out as controlling the content of its message boards and did so through content guidelines, moderators who enforced them, and screening software. The court said bulletin boards should normally be treated as distributors when they do not exercise significant editorial control. The case settled later in 1995

The Fourth Circuit later wrote that under Stratton Oakmont, services that regulated offensive material “risked subjecting themselves to liability.” The 1996 conference report on the law states that “one of the specific purposes” of Section 230 was to overrule Stratton Oakmont and similar decisions that treated services as publishers because they restricted access to objectionable material.

Early Interpretation

In Zeran v. America Online (1997), the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230 bars claims that would hold a service liable for “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions,” such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw or alter content. The plaintiff argued that AOL had been notified of anonymous defamatory posts about him and unreasonably delayed removing them; the court held that a service does not become liable as a distributor once it is notified, because distributor liability is a form of publisher liability. It noted that the person who wrote the post remains liable for it.

Many other federal courts have followed Zeran’s reading. Its holding on notice has also been questioned: in a 2020 statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes v. Enigma Software Group, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the text of Section 230(c)(1) grants immunity only from being treated as a publisher or speaker, and that courts beginning with Zeran had extended it to distributor liability.

Exceptions

Section 230(e) leaves several areas of law untouched: federal criminal law, intellectual property law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and similar state laws, and state laws consistent with the section. The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA-SESTA), enacted in 2018, added subsection (e)(5), which excludes from the immunity certain civil claims and state criminal prosecutions involving sex trafficking, and state prosecutions for promoting or facilitating prostitution.

Impact on Digital Platforms

Section 230 applies to services that host user-generated content, including:

  • Social media platforms
  • User review sites and forums
  • Comment sections on news sites
  • Video and content sharing platforms
  • Messaging services, wikis, and other user-generated content services

Ongoing Debates

Proposals to narrow or end Section 230 have come from legal scholars, members of both parties and the executive branch, and the statute’s authors and civil liberties groups have argued against them.

Conditioning the immunity on reasonable moderation. In a 2017 Fordham Law Review article titled “The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity,” Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes argued that courts had extended the immunity to sites that deliberately host illegal content. They proposed revising (c)(1) to condition its protection on a service taking reasonable steps against unlawful uses of its platform. In written testimony for a House Energy and Commerce hearing in October 2019, Citron restated the proposal as protecting only a service “that takes reasonable steps to address known unlawful uses of its services that create serious harm to others.” In her oral statement to two of the committee’s subcommittees, she said the law should be kept but its shield conditioned on what she and Wittes call reasonable content moderation practices.

Keeping the immunity as courts have read it. At the same hearing, Corynne McSherry, legal director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argued against amendments that would increase platforms’ liability for user content. She said added liability risk “will inevitably lead to overcensorship,” because removing a post is cheaper than defending it in court, and that new legal burdens would favor the largest companies, which can afford moderation and litigation, over smaller competitors. In a 2023 amicus brief in Gonzalez v. Google, Senator Ron Wyden and former Representative Christopher Cox, who co-authored Section 230, wrote that Congress drafted it to be technology-neutral and that the recommendation algorithms at issue were “direct descendants” of the content curation Congress meant to protect. They also wrote that the immunity does not cover a platform that helped create the content at issue, solicited illegal content, or is sued over conduct other than publishing what others post.

The scope of good-faith removal. Subsection (c)(2) protects removals made in good faith, and disputes have turned on whether (c)(1) also protects removal decisions. Executive Order 13925, signed by President Donald Trump in May 2020, stated that online platforms “are engaging in selective censorship” and directed the Commerce Department to petition the Federal Communications Commission for rules on when a removal is not taken in good faith, including removals that are “deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of service.” President Joe Biden revoked the order in May 2021. In his 2020 Malwarebytes statement, Justice Thomas wrote that by reading (c)(1) to protect any decision to edit or remove content, courts had “curtailed the limits Congress placed on decisions to remove content.”

Repeal and sunset bills. In December 2025, Rep. Harriet Hageman introduced H.R. 6746, which would end Section 230 after December 31, 2026, and Sen. Lindsey Graham introduced S. 3546 with nine cosponsors from both parties, which would repeal it two years after enactment. Both were referred to committee; see Section 230 sunset bills introduced in Congress.

State moderation laws. Texas and Florida laws restricting how large social media platforms moderate content raised a related First Amendment question, covered in NetChoice v. Paxton.

Fuentes

  1. 01.

    U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2023 Edition). 47 U.S.C. § 230 — Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. Source for the (b) policy statements, the (c)(1) publisher-or-speaker rule, the (c) heading 'Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material', the (c)(2) protection for good-faith restriction of access, and the (e) exceptions for federal criminal law, intellectual property, consistent state law, communications privacy, and, in (e)(5), certain sex-trafficking claims and state prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 2421A.

  2. 02.

    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. Enacting law, signed February 8, 1996. Title V is the Communications Decency Act; § 509 added Section 230 to the Communications Act of 1934.

  3. 03.

    U.S. House of Representatives, via U.S. Government Publishing Office. Telecommunications Act of 1996: Conference Report to Accompany S. 652 (H. Rept. 104-458). (1996). Page 194, the conferees' explanation of new section 230: 'One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.'

  4. 04.

    Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) archive. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). (1991). Text of the opinion, decided October 29, 1991. Source for the description of CompuServe's service as 'in essence an electronic, for-profit library'; for 'CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand'; for the standard 'whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements'; and for summary judgment for CompuServe.

  5. 05.

    Digital Media Law Project, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. Case entry for the unpublished New York Supreme Court (Nassau County) decision of May 24, 1995 (1995 WL 323710), on the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Source for the holding that Prodigy's public statements claiming editorial control, its content guidelines, Board Leaders who enforced them, and screening software were sufficient to treat it as a publisher; for the court's statement that bulletin boards should normally be considered distributors when they do not exercise significant editorial control; for its distinction of CompuServe; and for the settlement in October 1995.

  6. 06.

    Electronic Frontier Foundation. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). (1997). Text of the opinion, decided November 12, 1997. Source for '§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service'; for the bar on suits over 'a publisher's traditional editorial functions — such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content'; for the holding that distributor liability is 'a subset, or a species, of publisher liability' and that notice does not remove the immunity; for the plaintiff's claim that AOL unreasonably delayed removing the posts after notice; for the statement that the original poster remains liable; for the observation that under Stratton Oakmont, services that regulated offensive material 'risked subjecting themselves to liability'; and for the reading that Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by Stratton Oakmont.

  7. 07.

    Jr., D. L. H. (2009). Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir.) (1997). Secondary account. Source for 'Many other federal courts have followed Zeran's interpretation of Section 230 to dismiss online libel suits.'

  8. 08.

    Supreme Court of the United States. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, No. 19-1284 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). (2020). Justice Thomas's statement that courts, beginning with Zeran, held that Section 230 eliminates distributor liability, although the text of § 230(c)(1) grants immunity only from being treated as the publisher or speaker; he wrote in favor of considering the statute's scope in an appropriate case. Also source for his statement that by construing § 230(c)(1) to protect any decision to edit or remove content, courts had 'curtailed the limits Congress placed on decisions to remove content' in § 230(c)(2)(A).

  9. 09.

    Kosseff, J. (2019). The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet. Cornell University Press. Book on the history of Section 230; its title refers to the 26 words of subsection (c)(1).

  10. 10.

    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253. Enacted April 11, 2018 (FOSTA-SESTA); source for the sex-trafficking carve-out now at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).

  11. 11.

    Supreme Court of the United States. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S. May 18, 2023). (2023). Per curiam slip opinion; the Court declined to address the scope of Section 230 immunity.

  12. 12.

    Citron, D. K. & Wittes, B. (2017). The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity. Fordham Law Review, 86(2), 401. Source for the authors' argument that courts have read § 230 too broadly, extending it to sites that deliberately host illegal content, and for their proposal to amend § 230(c)(1); the proposed text is quoted from Citron's 2019 testimony, which restates it.

  13. 13.

    U.S. House of Representatives, via U.S. Government Publishing Office. Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Serial No. 116-69. (2021). Printed record of the October 16, 2019 hearing. Source for Danielle Keats Citron's oral statement that Section 230 should be kept but its shield conditioned on 'what Ben Wittes and I have called reasonable content moderation practices', and for Corynne McSherry's oral statement as EFF legal director that 'increased liability risk will inevitably lead to overcensorship', that removal is cheaper than litigation, and that new legal burdens would favor companies able to pay for moderation and litigation over smaller competitors.

  14. 14.

    Citron, D. K. (2019). Prepared Written Testimony and Statement for the Record, Hearing on 'Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers'. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Written statement for the October 16, 2019 hearing. Source for the Citron–Wittes proposed revision of § 230(c)(1): 'No provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes reasonable steps to address known unlawful uses of its services that create serious harm to others shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider…'

  15. 15.

    Supreme Court of the United States. Brief of Senator Ron Wyden and Former Representative Christopher Cox as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2023). (2023). Source for the amici's statement that they co-authored Section 230 in 1995; that Congress drafted it in a technology-neutral manner; that recommending systems relying on algorithms are 'the direct descendants of the early content curation efforts that Congress had in mind'; and that a platform is not immune when it is responsible for creating or developing the content, solicited or encouraged illegal content, or is sued over conduct other than publishing third-party content.

  16. 16.

    Federal Register, via U.S. Government Publishing Office. Executive Order 13925 of May 28, 2020, Preventing Online Censorship, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079. (2020). Source for the order's statement that 'Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship', for its policy on § 230(c)(2) good faith, and for section 2(b), directing the Secretary of Commerce, acting through NTIA, to petition the FCC for regulations clarifying when a restriction is not 'taken in good faith', including whether actions that are 'deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider's terms of service' qualify.

  17. 17.

    Federal Register, via U.S. Government Publishing Office. Executive Order 14029 of May 14, 2021, Revocation of Certain Presidential Actions and Technical Amendment, 86 Fed. Reg. 27025. (2021). Source for the revocation of Executive Order 13925 (Preventing Online Censorship).

  18. 18.

    U.S. Government Publishing Office. H.R. 6746, Sunset To Reform Section 230 Act, 119th Congress (introduced December 16, 2025). (2025). Introduced text. Source for the sponsor (Rep. Hageman), referral to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the added subsection providing that Section 230 'shall have no force or effect after December 31, 2026.'

  19. 19.

    U.S. Government Publishing Office. S. 3546, Sunset Section 230 Act, 119th Congress (introduced December 17, 2025). (2025). Introduced text. Source for the sponsor (Sen. Graham) and nine cosponsors (Durbin, Grassley, Whitehouse, Hawley, Klobuchar, Blackburn, Blumenthal, Moody, Welch), referral to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the repeal taking effect 'on the date that is 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act.'

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