In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina statute barring registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social networking websites impermissibly restricted lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. Assuming without deciding that the statute was content neutral, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny and found the law not narrowly tailored, because it burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the State’s interest in protecting minors. The decision was 8-0 as to the judgment (Justice Gorsuch did not participate).
Legal Background
Case Origins: In 2008, North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for registered sex offenders to access commercial social networking websites where minors could become members or create profiles. The law applied broadly to all registered sex offenders regardless of their specific crimes or threat levels.
Legal Question: Whether North Carolina’s blanket prohibition on social media access for registered sex offenders violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.
Key Provisions
The Court’s decision addressed several constitutional principles:
Social Media Access Protection: The Court stated that a fundamental First Amendment principle is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and identified social media as one of the most important such places today. On that basis it held the statute could not stand, without announcing a general right of access to social media.
Modern Public Square Doctrine: Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court described social media as, “for many,” among “the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”
Intermediate Scrutiny Standard: Assuming without deciding that the statute was content neutral, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny: such restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and must not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
Narrow Tailoring Requirement: Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court held that the statute burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the State’s interest in protecting minors, because it barred access to a wide range of websites regardless of whether any minor was involved.
Impact on Digital Platforms
Packingham v. North Carolina addressed the scope of online discourse protections:
- Held that a state may not bar a category of people from social media through a restriction that sweeps as broadly as the North Carolina statute
- Applied ordinary First Amendment scrutiny to a law restricting internet access, rather than treating the medium as warranting reduced protection
- Described social media, in the Court’s own words, as among “the principal sources for knowing current events” and for “speaking and listening in the modern public square”
Legal Challenges and Evolution
Constitutional Analysis: Assuming the statute was content neutral, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny and found it not narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in protecting minors, since it barred access to a broad range of websites unrelated to that interest.
8-0 Decision: All eight participating justices agreed the law was unconstitutionally broad (Justice Gorsuch did not participate). Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court was joined by four justices; Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, concurred only in the judgment and criticized the majority’s “undisciplined dicta” about internet-as-public-forum analogies.
Precedential Impact: The decision has continued to be cited in Supreme Court litigation over digital speech. In Moody v. NetChoice (2024), Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in the judgment opens by quoting Packingham for the proposition that social media platforms have become the “modern public square.”
Digital Politics Implications
The ruling affects digital political organizing by:
- Protecting access to platforms used for political speech and organizing from government restriction
- Establishing constitutional limits on government restrictions of social media use
- Creating framework for challenging overly broad government-imposed access restrictions
- Informing debates over government authority to restrict digital platform access
Packingham v. North Carolina struck down one broad state restriction on social media access as insufficiently tailored under intermediate scrutiny, and the Supreme Court has cited it in later cases on digital speech, including Moody v. NetChoice (2024).
Sources
- 01.
Supreme Court of the United States. Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98. (2017). Slip opinion, No. 15-1194, argued February 27, 2017 and decided June 19, 2017. Source for the text of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5, the 2008 enactment date, the holding, the assumed-content-neutral intermediate scrutiny analysis, the 'modern public square' passage, the lineup (Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; Alito, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.), and Gorsuch, J.'s non-participation.
- 02.
Supreme Court of the United States (U.S. Reports, Library of Congress). Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844. (1997). The precedent Packingham quotes at 521 U.S. 870 for the internet's 'relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.'
- 03.
Supreme Court of the United States. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, No. 22-277 (U.S. July 1, 2024). (2024). Later Supreme Court case in which Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, opens Part I by quoting Packingham, 582 U.S. 98, 107, for social media as the 'modern public square'. Evidence of the decision's continued citation; the quotation appears in the concurrence, not in the opinion of the Court.