Content Takedowns
Accounts and pages removed for coordinated inauthentic behavior and state-linked information operations by platform, 2018–2024
Meta has disrupted more than 200 coordinated inauthentic behavior networks originating from 68 countries since 2017
Twitter disclosed approximately 75,000 state-linked accounts to its information operations archive before discontinuing reporting
Meta's removal of a China-origin network in Q3 2023 was its largest single CIB enforcement action
Twitter/X has not published state-linked information operations disclosures since the October 2022 ownership change
Accounts Removed for Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior by Platform
Comparative Dataset
Context
Platform enforcement against coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) and state-linked information operations began in earnest in 2018, when both Meta and Twitter established formal disclosure processes. Meta removed its first CIB networks in August 2018, while Twitter launched its information operations archive in October of that year. By the end of 2022, Meta had disrupted more than 200 CIB networks originating from 68 countries and operating in at least 42 languages.
Enforcement activity peaked in 2019 and 2020 across both platforms, coinciding with heightened concerns about foreign interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Twitter's disclosures during this period included operations linked to Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Cuba, among others. Meta's April 2020 report alone documented the removal of 732 Facebook accounts, 793 pages, 200 groups, and 162 Instagram accounts across eight distinct CIB networks.
Twitter's information operations disclosures ceased after the platform's October 2022 ownership change and have not resumed in comparable form. While X published a Global Transparency Report covering H1 2024, it reported 5.3 million total account suspensions without a separate breakdown for state-linked manipulation. YouTube does not publish comparable data on accounts removed for coordinated political manipulation, though it briefly enforced an election misinformation policy from December 2020 until reversing it in June 2023.
Citations & Data Sources
- 01.
Meta. Taking Down More Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior. First CIB disclosure (August 2018); removed accounts linked to Russia and Iran
about.fb.com/news/2018/08/more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior - 02.
Meta. Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Reports (2019). Monthly CIB reports; Meta took down over 50 networks worldwide in 2019
about.fb.com/news/tag/coordinated-inauthentic-behavior - 03.
Meta. April 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report. Example monthly report; April 2020 alone: 732 Facebook accounts, 793 pages, 200 groups, 162 Instagram accounts removed across 8 networks
about.fb.com/news/2020/05/april-cib-report - 04.
Meta. Adversarial Threat Report (December 2021). Annual report; more than 150 covert influence operations publicly disclosed since 2017
about.fb.com/news/2021/12/metas-adversarial-threat-report - 05.
Meta. Recapping Our 2022 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Enforcements. Cumulative: more than 200 CIB networks disrupted since 2017, from 68 countries, in 42+ languages
about.fb.com/news/2022/12/metas-2022-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-enforcements - 06.
Meta. Adversarial Threat Report, First Quarter 2023. 6 CIB networks removed in Q1 2023; Q3 2023 included 7,704 accounts (China-origin network, largest single CIB takedown)
about.fb.com/news/2023/05/metas-adversarial-threat-report-first-quarter-2023 - 07.
Meta. Threat Disruptions — Transparency Center. Quarterly adversarial threat reports for 2024
transparency.meta.com/metasecurity/threat-reporting - 08.
Twitter. Enabling further research of information operations on Twitter. First archive release: 3,841 accounts (Russia/IRA) and 770 accounts (Iran)
blog.x.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/enabling-further-research-of-information-operations-on-twitter.html - 09.
Twitter. Information operations archive disclosures (2019). Multiple 2019 disclosures including China (936 core + 4,302 follow-up), Saudi Arabia (5,929), and others
blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/info-ops-disclosure-data-september-2019 - 10.
Twitter. Disclosing removed networks to our archive of state-linked information operations. Multiple 2020 disclosures from Russia, Turkey, China, Cuba, Thailand, and other countries
blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/disclosing-removed-networks-to-our-archive-of-state-linked-information - 11.
Twitter. Disclosing state-linked information operations we've removed. Final disclosure before reporting hiatus; 3,465 accounts from six countries; cumulative archive: ~85,000 accounts from 20+ countries
blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/disclosing-state-linked-information-operations-we-ve-removed - 12.
X. Global Transparency Report H1 2024. First transparency report since December 2021; 5.3 million accounts suspended in H1 2024 (all reasons), but no comparable CIB/info ops disclosure
transparency.x.com/content/dam/transparency-twitter/2024/x-global-transparency-report-h1.pdf